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Since the conclusion of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol negotiations, the Chinese 
government has been steadily increasing measures for the reduction of its greenhouse 
gases (GHG) emissions. Meanwhile, the Russian government has been extremely hesitant 
to even acknowledge humanity’s role in climate change. This thesis investigates why 
China and Russia have chosen to take such divergent paths regarding climate change 
after compliance obligations were established at Kyoto. The factors considered include 
shifts in national public opinion regarding climate change, economics, demographics, 
expected future effects of global warming, resources, and the Kyoto Protocol itself.   
The case studies of Chinese and Russian climate change policies and programs 
highlight three significant factors in the divergence: 1) the Kyoto Protocol, which set the 
initial policy baselines for both countries; 2) geography and demography, which forced 
China to take actions to combat climate change since it is half the size of Russia but has 
roughly ten times as many people; and 3) the lengthy and continuous leadership of 
Russia’s current president—Vladimir Putin—who has held the position of either 
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At the beginning of the 1990s, the Soviet Union and China were far and away the 
two largest communist countries in the World. Even though the Soviet Union would soon 
collapse in 1991, there was still no reason to expect that these two countries—with so 
many obvious similarities—would take such different approaches in their policies 
regarding climate change and global warming. However, that is exactly what has 
happened. Since the conclusion of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol negotiations—which many 
experts refer to as the first ever meaningful multinational climate change agreement—the 
Chinese government has been steadily increasing measures for the reduction of its 
greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions. Meanwhile, the Russian government has been 
extremely hesitant to even acknowledge humanity’s role in climate change and has taken 
virtually almost no steps toward reducing Russia’s GHGs emissions. 
This thesis investigates why China and Russia have chosen to take such divergent 
paths regarding climate change since the foundational origins were established at Kyoto. 
The areas of focus include shifts in national public opinion regarding climate change, 
economics, demographics, expected future effects of global warming, resources, and the 
Kyoto Protocol itself. 
There has been a significant shift in public opinion regarding climate change since 
the late 1990s. This shift has resulted in a broader, almost worldwide, acceptance that 
global warming is indeed occurring. It is extremely important to identify the expected 
effects, because they may have a profound impact on every nation in the world. There is 
little doubt that the majority of the effects of climate change will have a negative impact 
on most nations, but there will also likely be benefits—even if only short term—
experienced by many nations as well. Identifying these expected effects at a national 
level is important in order to identify what countries are best poised to benefit in the 
future from global warming. The majority of research has concentrated on either proving 
that global warming is occurring or investigating what can be done to halt or minimize its 
effects in the future. The significance of this thesis is that it looks beyond the global 
phenomena in order to seek a deeper understanding of why two of the world’s largest 
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emitters of GHGs emissions have chosen essentially to head in opposite directions in the 
fight against global warming. Comparing and contrasting China’s and Russia’s climate 
change policies and programs may also help to identify gaps in current policy and assist 
with suggestions for future policy prescriptions. 
This topic is important for U.S. national security policy because of the inherent 
importance of climate change for the United States and its allies. China and Russia are 
among the most influential states in determining the future of coordinated international 
responses to climate change, and it is imperative to gain a better understanding of the 
determinants of their policies in this domain. 
3 
II. COMPARISONS AND POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS
The Working Group I contribution to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC’s) Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) states, “Warming of the climate system 
is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the observed changes are unprecedented 
over decades to millennia. The atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow 
and ice have diminished, sea level has risen, and the concentrations of greenhouse gases 
have increased.”1  This warming of the climate system may be regarded by specialists as 
a scientific fact, but convincing public opinion of it throughout the world remains a huge 
problem. 
Adding to this difficulty is the fact that, even though average temperatures are 
shown to be increasing through scientific research, these average increases are 
being masked in the huge temperature shifts being seen all over the world. It is 
easy not to notice this increase when extreme temperatures are being experienced on 
both ends of the thermometer. This has led to different levels of national beliefs in 
the global warming phenomenon itself. For example, Elena Lioubimtseva, director 
of the Environmental Studies Program at Grand Valley State University, writes: 
Climate change is not regarded as an acute environmental problem by 
Russia’s general public. Recent opinion polls indicate that a significant 
percentage of the Russian public does not see climate change as a very 
important issue and does not approve of spending taxpayers’ money on 
climate change mitigation.2 
The 2007–2008 Gallup global opinion survey also showed that 97% of Americans 
were aware of climate change compared to 85% of Russians, and 62% of Chinese. The 
most telling survey statistic of all, though, was perhaps that 63% of Americans believed 
that climate change was a serious personal threat compared to 39% of Russians and only 
1. T. F. Stocker et al., “IPCC, 2013: Summary for Policymakers,” in Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science
Basis: Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 4, https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg1/
WG1AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf. 
2. Elena Lioubimtseva, “Russia’s Role in the Post-2012 Climate Change Policy: Key Contradictions and
Uncertainties,” Forum on Public Policy, (2012), 11, http://forumonpublicpolicy.com/spring2010.vol2010/
spring2010archive/lioubimtseva.pdf. 
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21% of Chinese. Whether or not public opinion agrees with the scientific community will 
not stop the effects that are expected to occur from the increase in the Earth’s average 
temperature.3 
A. COMPARING ECONOMIES 
The Cold War came to an end with various events, including the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1991. In the early 1990s, the two largest communist countries in the 
world accelerated their distinct, ground-breaking shifts toward capitalism. Russia’s shift 
involved a much more drastic reform approach, patterned after the “shock therapy”—or 
“big bang”—reform that had recently been implemented in Poland’s transition toward a 
free market society.4  In contrast, China chose a slower-paced economic approach. 
According to Doug Guthrie, 
As practitioners, the architects of the Chinese reforms have embraced the 
gradualist view, and it has led to a gradual and stable path through the 
economic reforms. Furthermore, the dramatic success of the first two-and-
a-half decades of reform in China (compared with the turmoil caused by 
rapid reform programs in countries like Russia) raises serious doubts about 
the shock therapy approach and the economic assumptions that undergird 
that view.5 
As Guthrie’s observation indicates, China’s transition toward capitalism began in 
the 1970s, well before Russia’s transition in the 1990s. Even though China’s single 
political party is still referred to as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), next to nothing 
within the party itself—outside of its overall oligarchical benefits structure—bears much 
resemblance to the original communist party for which it was named. 
With such different paths toward more capitalist systems, one might expect 
distinct policies for combating climate change. The reality, though, as previously 
highlighted, is that both the Chinese and Russian governments are much more concerned 
                                                 
3. Anita Pugliese and Julie Ray, “Top-Emitting Countries Differ on Climate Change Threat: Chinese see least 
threat from global warming; Japanese see the most,” Gallup December 7, 2009, http://www.gallup.com/poll/124595/
Top-Emitting-Countries-Differ-Climate-Change-Threat.aspx. 
4. Jeffrey D. Sachs, “The End of Poverty (2005): A Plan to Establish a Market Economy,” in Political Economy 
Reader: Markets as Institutions, ed. Naazneen H. Barma and Steven K. Vogel (New York: Routledge, 2008), 365. 
5. Doug Guthrie, “China and Globalization (2006): The Politics of Market Reform,” in Political Economy Reader: 
Markets as Institutions, ed. Naazneen H. Barma and Steven K. Vogel (New York: Routledge, 2008), 399–400. 
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with national economic performance than with reducing national GHGs emissions. For 
the most part, industrial standards aimed at reducing GHGs emissions are much more 
costly than standards that are not designed to attain this goal. Therefore, the overall 
national economic benefits involved with reducing emissions in China and Russia are 
insignificant, at least in the short term. Instead, economic incentives would seem to deter 
both countries from reducing emissions, rather than to provide either country with any 
sort of motivation for the reduction of emissions. 
That is not to say that the economic benefits of reducing GHGs emissions within 
China and Russia are a complete zero-sum game. Some argue that there are overall 
economic benefits in reducing GHGs emissions levels now because addressing these 
requirements at present, will, in the long run, end up costing just a fraction of the 
exponential penalties that would be incurred by putting off reductions until a later date. 
While this argument would seem to hold water—and in all likelihood may end up 
proving to be accurate—it is currently difficult to quantify. At a time when many people 
seem to be more oriented to achieving instant gratification than pursuing long term goals 
it can be extremely difficult to make the case for the potential benefits associated with 
long range results. 
B. DEMOGRAPHICS 
In order to investigate possible explanations of why China and Russia have 
differed so drastically in their actions to reduce GHGs within their own borders, it is 
important to compare the two countries at the demographic level. Russia is the world’s 
largest country in terms of land area with a total area of 17,075,200 square kilometers 
(6,592,735 square miles). China is the second largest, with a total of 9,596,960 square 
kilometers (3,705,406 square miles).6  Russia has the ninth largest population in the 
world, at about 2% of the total population (142,098,141). Meanwhile, China has the 
world’s largest population, at about 19% of the total population (1,401,586,609).7  In 
                                                 
6. Nations Encyclopedia, s.v. “The Russian Federation,” http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Europe/
Russia.html#ixzz3kErSNJOW. 
7. World Population, Worldometers, accessed August 30, 2015, http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/
china-population/. 
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other words, in geographic terms Russia is nearly twice the size of China, while China 
has roughly ten times as many people as Russia. 
This demographic data helps to explain why China, at 23%, is by far the largest 
emitter of GHGs in the world. It also helps to explain why Russia is responsible for 5% 
of the world’s GHGs emissions. Moreover, this data brings out a few other not so 
obvious facts. The first is that Russia actually has a much higher emissions per capita rate 
than China. Russia is responsible for only 5% of the world’s GHGs emissions, which is 
about 2.5 times its percentage of the world’s overall population. China is responsible for 
23% of the world’s GHGs emissions, which is about 1.2 times its percentage of the 
world’s overall population. This means that Russia has over two times the GHGs 
emissions rate per capita than does China. Yet when it comes to the steps that these 
countries are taking to reduce GHGs emissions, they are headed in what appear to be 
almost polar-opposite directions. 
This demographic data may also help to explain why the two countries are taking 
divergent steps to reduce GHGs emissions. It should be recalled that, though Russia may 
emit twice the GHGs per capita compared to China, Russia’s population is only one tenth 
the size of China’s, and—on top of that—Russia is nearly twice the size of China. One of 
the most basic ways to put this overall demographic data into perspective is to point out 
that the Russian population simply does not have to experience the same visible pollution 
levels that the Chinese population does—on an almost daily basis—in major cities, 
including Beijing. Russia’s population has the luxury of being able to spread out over its 
vast countryside, while China’s population is faced with having to congregate in much 
more densely populated cities, since its area is only half that of Russia. 
C. THE FUTURE EFFECTS OF GLOBAL WARMING 
Some of the effects of global warming already being seen today include floods, 
droughts, and heat waves. A few examples of the future effects being predicted include a 
lack of fresh water, melting of permafrost, and increased access to Arctic sea lanes.   
While average global rainfall remains at relatively the same level, its distribution 
throughout the world is becoming extremely uneven. This is causing areas that are 
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already traditionally accustomed to experiencing droughts to have to endure them on 
even greater and more destructive levels. On the other end of the spectrum, areas that 
have typically received substantial rainfall are now dealing with an even heavier amount, 
which is not only increasing the overall extent of floods within these regions but also 
each flood’s overall destruction capacity as well.8 
1. Effects in Russia 
These same imbalances in rainfall and other weather phenomena are being 
experienced throughout Russia in the form of floods, droughts, heat waves, rapid frosts, 
tornados and heavy snowfalls. Observation results in Russia have noted a 6.3% annual 
increase in these hydrometeorological events (HDE). The economic impact of these 
events is becoming more apparent as well. For example, a 2013 research report suggested 
that “without adequate measures to adapt agriculture to climate change, the annual 
economic loss from a decrease in climate-determined crop yield in Russia is estimated at 
RUB 108bn (approximately $3.5bn) by 2020 and over RUB 120bn (approximately 
$3.9bn) by 2050.”9 
The thawing of permafrost in Russia’s northern regions is leading to infrastructure 
issues as well, such as the need for the reconstruction of roads and gas and oil pipelines. 
While Russia’s northern region is almost entirely rural, it holds about 75% of Russia’s oil 
production and about 93% of Russia’s natural gas. Therefore, even though it does not 
directly and immediately affect the majority of Russia’s population, this thawing of 





                                                 
8. O.A. Anisimov et al., “Russia and Neighboring Countries:  Environmental, Economic and Social Impacts of 
Climate Change,” OXFAM GB and WWF Russia, (2008), 14, http://www.wwf.ru/resources/publ/book/eng/275. 
9. “Economic Analysis of the Impact of Climate Change on Agriculture in Russia: National and Regional 
Aspects,” Oxfam Research Reports, April 2013, https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/rr-
economic-impacts-climate-change-agriculture-russia-010413-en_0.pdf. 
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and export its natural resources in the future. As of 2010, Russia was spending about $1.8 
billion annually on upkeep on its gas and oil pipelines. Future spending on maintenance 
for these pipelines is expected to increase as global temperatures continue to rise.10 
The analytical literature suggests that Russia will also experience a number of 
noticeable positive effects from global warming. The Arctic region is a likely venue for 
many of these expected positive effects. To begin with, the navigation of sea lanes is 
expected to improve due to the melting of the Arctic’s sea ice. As Daniel Moran puts it, 
“Though Russia is normally thought of as remote and landlocked, if it were to face 
warmer Arctic conditions, it could find itself with one of the world’s longest 
commercially viable coastlines and with access to polar shipping routes that would 
facilitate its trade with Europe, Asia, and North America.”11  Additionally, the increases 
in average global temperatures are likely to reduce the cost of providing heat to people in 
Russia’s inhabited regions. Russia’s expected temperature increases should also make 
much of its territory more desirable for habitation and future commercial development. 
Some also hold that global warming could have a very positive effect on Russia’s 
agricultural system. For instance, Gus Lubin and Mamta Badkar write, “Global warming 
could increase Russia’s arable land by 37 to 67 percent, according to researchers at the 
University of Illinois. This would add 425,000 square miles of farmland—an area three 
times the size of Montana.”12 While this sounds promising, the current Russian 
agricultural system is considered to be primitive and too inefficient to take full advantage 
of these possible gains. Therefore, it is more likely that global warming would have a 
minimal impact—if any—on Russia’s future agricultural gains, at least in the near term. 
Samuel Charp and Georgi V. Safonov wrote in 2010 regarding global warming’s effect 
                                                 
10. Samuel Charp and Georgi V. Safonov, “Climate Change and Role of Energy Efficiency,” from Russia After 
The Global Economic Crisis,(Washington, D.C.: Edward Brothers Inc., 2010), 128–130. 
11. Daniel Moran, Climate Change and National Security: A Country-Level Analysis, (Washington, D.C.: 
Georgetown University, 2011), 115–16. 
12. Gus Lubin and Mamta Badkar, “The Good, The Bad And The Ugly Effects Of Global Warming In Russia,” 
Business Insider, August 1, 2011, http://www.businessinsider.com/russian-permafrost-melting-2011-07. 
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on Russian agriculture, “Studies based on highly detailed models suggest that global 
warming will have a net zero effect on the sector.”13 
Possibly the biggest climate change benefit of all for Russia could be the 
increased access to many of its previously untapped natural resources in its claimed 
territorial waters.   According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS), each state has the right to claim 12 nautical miles from its coast for territorial 
waters and 200 miles from its coast as its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Within a 
state’s Exclusive Economic Zone, that state retains the right to all living and non-living 
resources. In 1909, Canada was the first country to declare that it claimed all land to the 
north of its territorial border as its sovereign territory, when Captain J. E. Bernier 
mounted a tablet on Melville Island inscribed: “This memorial is erected to 
commemorate the taking possession for the Dominion of Canada of the whole Arctic 
archipelago lying to the north of America from longitude 60° W. to 141° W. up to the 
latitude of 90° N.”14 Canada’s 1909 declaration may have contributed to the Soviet 
Union’s proclamation of 1926, which decreed that all lands to the north of the Soviet 
Union—up to and including the North Pole—were Soviet territory.15  Ironically, the 
enhancement of access to natural resources that Russia may experience from the warming 
of the Arctic could end up being offset and minimized by most of the developing world 
turning away from carbon-based energy in campaigns against global warming.16 
2. Effects in China  
China is the world’s largest emitter of GHGs, and it has come to a point where the 
effects and challenges facing the country as a result can no longer be ignored. The 
Chinese government has—for the most part—avoided the international pressures that 
have been brewing since the mid-1990s regarding climate change, but it also has recently 
                                                 
13. Charp and Safonov, “Climate Change and Role of Energy Efficiency,” 130. 
14. Ivan L. Head, “Canadian Claims to Territorial Sovereignty in the Arctic Regions,” McGill Law Journal 9, no. 
3 (1963): 211, http://lawjournal.mcgill.ca/userfiles/other/131472-head.pdf. 
15. Marlene Laruelle, Russia’s Arctic Strategies and the Future of the Far North (New York: Taylor and Francis, 
2015), 94–96.  
16. Moran, Climate Change and National Security, 115–16. 
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begun to experience some of its overall effects within its own environment. These 
internal effects have seemingly helped push China to take actions aimed at combating 
climate change. 
According to a 2011 synthesis report from China’s leading climate change 
scientists, “It is very likely that future climate change would cause significant adverse 
impacts on the ecosystem, agriculture, water resources, and coastal zones in China.”17  
China has already begun to feel the effects of increased droughts and flooding. Other 
effects include glacial melting in the Himalayas and a decline in China’s agricultural 
output. China’s leaders have begun to acknowledge the problem, as Yu Qingtai, China’s 
special ambassador for climate change, stated, “The issue of climate change has become 
a serious challenge in today’s world. It affects not only the development of the global 
economy and prosperity, but also the very existence of mankind. A united front to 
confront this challenge, and to safeguard the common home of mankind has become the 
unanimous appeal by all members of the international community.”18 
China could nonetheless do a lot more to curb its GHGs emissions. Some of the 
predicted future effects may cause China to finally take more significant actions. Rainfall 
in northern China is expected to continue its decline, causing even more severe droughts 
and making fresh water a scarce resource in the near future. Studies have predicted that 
precipitation could decrease by as much as 30% by the second half of the twenty-first 
century in numerous river regions in northern China.   Meanwhile, rainfall in southern 
China is expected to continue to increase and to lead to even more severe flooding in the 
future. 
Additionally, climate change is expected to increase the intensity of China’s heat 
waves. These increased temperatures will likely lead to more transmissions of infectious 
diseases. Daniel Moran points out yet another climate change problem China will likely 
                                                 
17. Lin Erda, Xu Yinlong, Wu Shaohong, Ju Hui, and Ma Shiming, “Synopsis of China National Climage Change 
Assessement Report (II): Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation,” Advances in Climate Change Research 3 (Suppl.) 
(2007): 1, quoted in Joanna I. Lewis, “China,” in Moran, Climate Change and National Security, 10. 
18. “Statement by H.E. Ambassador Yu Qingtai, China’s Special Representative for Climate Change,” Thematic 
Debate of the United Nations General Assembly on Climate Change, February 12, 2008, http://www.china-un.org/eng/
hyyfy/t406936.htm. 
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experience, as a result of its expected glacial melting. In Moran’s words, “The Yellow 
and Yangtze rivers, which support the richest agricultural regions of the country and 
derive much of their water from the Tibetan glaciers, will initially experience floods as 
the glaciers melt, and then drought, once the glacial runoff is gone.”19 
D. RESOURCE COMPARISON 
There is an obvious discrepancy when comparing the size of China’s population 
to the extent of its arable land. China’s population makes up more than 20% of the 
world’s total, but China has only about 7% of the world’s arable land. This discrepancy is 
expected to increase for two reasons. One reason is that China has a comparatively high 
birth rate, and the second is a predicted decline in China’s future crop production. 
According to Moran, “Scientists predict a 5 to 10 percent decline in overall crop 
productivity in China by 2030 as a result of climate change, and a decline of up to 37 
percent in rice, maize, and wheat yields after 2050.”  How is China going to compensate 
for these productivity reductions, which are bound to pose a serious threat to its long-
term food security?20 
Russia is the exact opposite of China when it comes to the size of its population 
compared to the magnitude of its fresh water resources and arable land. Moreover, unlike 
China, Russia’s population has been shrinking for over 20 years. Russia’s population 
makes up just 2% of the world’s total, but it possesses 20% of the world’s fresh water 
reserve and about 7% of the world’s arable land.21 
E. THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 
The Kyoto Protocol was established in 1997 in Kyoto, Japan. It has been widely 
hailed as the first global step toward the reduction of GHGs because of its establishment 
of specific emissions limits on industrialized nations. At present, there are 192 parties to 
the Kyoto Protocol, but only 37 of those parties have binding targets in its current second 
                                                 
19. Moran, Climate Change and National Security, 11. 
20. Ibid., 13. 
21. O. A. Anisimov et al., “Russia and Neighboring Countries,” 14, 30. 
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period. The first period of the Kyoto Protocol began in 2008, and the second began in 
2013. Many of the Kyoto Protocol’s original parties have gone in entirely different 
directions from their commitments within the protocol’s original framework, as 
evidenced by the reduced number of parties with active binding targets.22 
Widespread belief in global warming and its harmful effects does not mean that 
every nation is going to act in concert in order to protect the ecosphere against rising 
temperatures in the future. Some observers believe that certain countries may be in a 
position to benefit from the warming temperatures, and that those countries might not 
want the phenomenon to slow down. These observers point to how support for the Kyoto 
Protocol diminished in Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and Russia, and other countries 
which did not sign up for the second commitment period under the Protocol (2013-
2020).23 
F. CARBON CAP AND TRADE UNDER THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 
When a member country signed up for a binding commitment under the first 
period of the Kyoto Protocol, that country was then required to reduce its GHGs 
emissions by 5.2% from its original baseline. Each participant country’s baseline was 
established in 1990, and there were three different ways that a participant country 
could—and still can—reach its 5.2% reduction goal. The first way was obvious in that a 
country could autonomously reach its goal by reducing its GHGs by the mandated 5.2%. 
The second way was to complete a portion of the 5.2% reduction goal and complete the 
remaining portion via trading emissions allowances. Emissions allowances could be 
obtained in trade from other participants in the Kyoto Protocol that had a surplus of such 
allowances. Moreover, surpluses could be achieved by country participants whose 
reductions were greater than the 5.2% mandate requirement. Russia and Ukraine had a 
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tremendous amount of surplus emissions allowances following the first period of the 
Kyoto Protocol.24 
The last way of achieving the mandate reduction was—and still is—to offset the 
difference below the 5.2% reduction goal by obtaining carbon emissions credits. These 
credits are gained through investing in carbon emission reduction projects in less 
developed countries. As explained in the Kyoto Protocol policy information, “Such 
projects are arguably more cost effective than projects implemented in richer nations 
because developing countries have on average lower energy efficiencies, lower labor 
costs, weaker regulatory requirements, and less advanced technologies.”25  The idea is 
that these investments will provide sustainability at a lower cost in countries that 
otherwise would not be able to afford to make this Kyoto Protocol commitment. This 
process is called the Clean Development Mechanism or CDM; it generates emissions 
credits called Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) that can then be traded, just like the 
surplus trades described earlier.26 
Joint Implementation (JI) works essentially the same as CDM except that JI 
projects occur in other participating Kyoto Protocol countries, while CDM projects take 
place in developing countries. In a JI project, both the host country and the investing 
country receive carbon emissions credits from the project, making it twice as beneficial 
for the hosting country.27 Jessica E. Tipton explains the entire process as follows: 
“Countries that manage to keep emissions below their targets can then sell surplus carbon 
credits to other countries risking non-compliance, a system known as carbon trading.”28 
In light of these comparisons and potential explanations of China’s and Russia’s 
divergent approaches toward combating climate change, it is next important to examine 
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each country’s actual climate change policies and programs, beginning with each 
country’s participation and negotiation in the Kyoto Protocol itself. Chapter III considers 




Given all the future effects of climate change expected in Russia, what steps have 
Russian leaders taken to implement climate change policies and programs?  As a result of 
the Kyoto Protocol’s original 1997 negotiations—as previously alluded to—Russia had 
placed itself in a prime position to reap many of the benefits that were expected to result 
from carbon caps and trading in the future. 
Additionally, on top of Russia’s expertly negotiated Kyoto Protocol baseline 
GHGs levels, Moscow also skillfully identified a potential windfall of even more carbon 
credits that could be obtained by enticing other countries to invest in Russian hosted Joint 
Implementation projects. As David Victor points out, “Russia and Ukraine are by far the 
cheapest sources of emissions credits—not because the Russians and Ukrainians have 
had an epiphany about the risks of global warming, but rather because their savvy 
negotiators got an emissions target in Kyoto that far exceeds the likely level of 
emissions.”29  Each participant country’s baseline for the Kyoto Protocol was established 
in 1990, just prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. As Victor noted in 2001, 
“Russia and Ukraine agreed in Kyoto to freeze emissions at 1990 levels, but the collapse 
of the post-Soviet economy in the early 1990s means that their emissions are already far 
below that target.”30  This helps to explain why Russia’s surplus of carbon emissions 
credits from the first period of the Kyoto Protocol far exceeds that of any other country. 
According to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
“There were 236 projects in the pipeline [worldwide] at the end of 2010 with the 
potential to offset more 400 million tons of emissions by 2012 . . . Russia dominates this 
market with more than 65 percent of the estimated annual emissions reductions for 
Kyoto’s enforcement period (2008-2012).”31 
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Even though Russia is only responsible for about 5% of the world’s greenhouse 
gasses (GHGs) emissions, it is still considered a significant player on the global energy 
stage. According to Elena Lioubimtseva, 
Russia is an energy superpower:  it is the world’s largest producer of 
natural gas (20.9% of world production), the second largest producer of 
crude oil (12.3% of world production) and the world’s sixth largest 
producer of coal (IEA 2010). It is the number one exporter of natural gas, 
accounting for more than 14% of the world’s gas export (IEA 2010), and 
the second top oil exporter after Saudi Arabia (IEA 2010).32 
It would seem to make sense that, based on the initial Kyoto Protocol 
negotiations, including the 1990 baseline GHGs emission figures, Russia would be 
motivated to proceed with its participation within the protocol. After all, the collapse of 
the Soviet Union in 1991 led to GHGs emissions in Russia dropping by almost 40% from 
1990 to 1998. Russia’s emissions have been on the rise ever since but still remain well 
below the originally negotiated 1990 baseline levels. According to some estimates, 
Russia isn’t expected to return to the 1990 emissions baseline levels until around 2025—
which would logically seem to suggest that Russia would want to continue to participate 
within the original Kyoto Protocol framework for as long as it could.33 
Even so, Russia debated whether or not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol based largely 
on the fact that the United States chose not to do so, in 2001. Russia was disappointed 
that the U. S. chose not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. As Tipton wrote in 2008, “The loss 
of U.S. demand for Russia’s carbon credits meant that this aspect of Kyoto would no 
longer bring Russia a guaranteed economic boon.”34 Tipton added that “Russia initially 
envisaged considerable economic gains from selling surplus quotas abroad and from 
foreign investment via Joint Implementation (JI) projects. After the USA pulled out of the 
Protocol in March 2001 for fear of the effect on the country’s economy, Russia’s 
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situation became more complicated.”35  After a few years of deliberation, however, 
Russia finally decided to ratify the Protocol in 2004.36 
An additional benefit that Russia has over almost every other participant under the 
Kyoto Protocol was—and remains—the emissions credits provided by the enormously 
expansive Russian forests. According to Lioubimtseva, 
More than 25% of the national domestic emissions (RF Fourth National 
Communication 2006) are absorbed by Russia’s natural and managed 
ecosystems including forests, wetlands, rangelands, and arable lands. The 
Russian boreal forests represent the largest forested region on Earth with 
more than 55% of the world’s conifers, 21–22% of the world’s growing 
stock, and 11% of the world’s live forest biomass (Houghton et al. 2007). 
Over 887 million hectares of forest and woodland remain, comprising 
52% of the land area of Russia.37 
Russia negotiated such advantageous terms under the Kyoto Protocol that it was 
expected that it would wish to continue to attempt to benefit from these terms for as long 
as possible. However, Russia did not sign on for a binding target under the second period 
of the Kyoto Protocol that began in 2013. 
A. RUSSIA BEYOND KYOTO 
Despite Russia’s active participation in the Kyoto Protocol, Russian leaders for a 
long time questioned what the human role was in causing climate change. It was not 
actually until 2009 that the Russian government seemed to stop its questioning and 
finally took an alternate public approach, when President Dmitry Medvedev finally chose 
to adopt a “‘Climate Doctrine,’ officially acknowledging anthropogenic climate change 
for the first time and finding that mitigation policies will have a net economic benefit for 
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the nation.”38  That very same year, Russia also publicly pledged at the Copenhagen 
Climate Change Conference to reduce its GHGs emissions by 15 to 25% by 2020.39 
One interpretation of this pledged reduction is that Russia was taking a positive 
step beyond the Kyoto Protocol to both acknowledge and actively contribute toward 
GHGs reduction on the global stage. With that being said though, achieving the 
reduction, in effect, required absolutely no action by the Russian government because the 
baseline was derived from the pre-Soviet Union collapse 1990 baseline levels. 
Russia’s continued insistence on using the 1990 baseline GHGs emission level is 
likely the single best overall indicator in determing if Russia is serious or not about about 
its role in combatting climate change. When Russia actually chooses to implement a 
climate change policy or program that establishes a new baseline (instead of the 
originally negotiated Kyoto Protocol baseline), international observers may actually start 
to believe that Russia is taking its global environmental protection role seriously. 
Another example that helps illustrate Russia’s overall seriousness regarding 
climate change is its participation in the Action Plan on Climate Change for the Barents 
Co-operation in 2013. The Russian Foreign Minister met with the Finnish, Norwegian, 
and Swedish Foreign Ministers and helped solidify a plan that was described as 
“containing concrete activities to be realized by the working groups under the Barents 
Euro-Arctic and Regional Councils.”40  On the surface, this sounded as if Russia had 
some sort of obligation under the plan. Upon further investigation, though, there were no 
explicit concrete activities required from Russia. 
Additionally, in 2014 Russia put forth a plan of action to ensure that it would 
reach the upper bound of its previous reduction goal established in Copenhagen in 2009. 
This affirmed Russia’s new target as a 25% GHGs emissions reduction by 2020, from its 
1990 baseline level. Russian officials attempted to sell the overall significance of the plan 
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of action by emphasizing the difficulty that was likely to be encountered in trying to 
achieve a goal at the upper end of the previously established window, rather than just 
merely setting a target at the lower end of the previously established window.41 
This led to one of Russia’s more recent declarations involving climate change. In 
March 2015, Russia submitted its most recent climate action plan to the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The English translation of Russia’s overall 
goal in its intended nationally determined contribution (INDC) and clarifying information 
on the UNFCCC website reads as follows: “limiting anthropogenic greenhouse gases in 
Russia to 70–75% of 1990 levels by the year 2030 might be a long-term indicator, subject 
to the maximum possible account of absorbing capacity of forests.”  In other words, 
Russia is attempting to reduce its GHGs emissions by 25–30% from its 1990 baseline 
level, but if for some reason Russia is not able to reach this target level—the Russian 
leadership has already conveniently identified the most likely main causal factor—it must 
be because not enough credit was given for the absorbing capacity of Russia’s expansive 
forests.42 
To most observers—on the surface—Russia’s latest UNFCCC target might seem 
like quite a lofty goal and a sizeable overall reduction in GHGs emissions. However, as 
one begins to dig deeper into the analysis of the numbers, this latest target might not be 
that significant. The most obvious problem with the new target is that Russia is once 
again choosing to use its pre-Soviet Union collapse 1990 baseline level, rather than a 
more up to date baseline that would more accurately reflect Russia’s actual GHGs 
emissions. It is important to keep this in mind because, as Frederic Legrand writes, “After 
the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia’s emissions fell to 56% below 1990 levels, including 
forests. They started rising gradually again in 2002 and by 2012 had reached 50% below 
1990 levels. Excluding land use, they were 32% below 1990 levels. This means that 
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Russia can significantly increase its emissions over the coming 15 years and still hit the 
2030 target set out in its INDC.”43 
Moreover, Russia’s current struggling economy by itself was expected to reduce 
Russia’s GHGs emissions by about 3 percent. Therefore, the combination of Russia’s 
struggling economy with the use of the 1990 baseline level alone would allow Russia to 
actually increase its overall GHGs emissions output and still be able to hit its latest 
emissions pledge under the INDC.44 
Predictably, though, Vladimir Putin is telling a much different story not only 
when it comes to Russia’s latest INDC emissions pledge, but also regarding Russia’s past 
GHGs emissions reductions. Russia, according to Putin, from 1991–2012, 
over-fulfilled its commitments under the Kyoto Protocol . . . and not only 
prevented an increase in greenhouse gas emissions but also considerably 
reduced them. Thanks to this, about 40 billion tons of carbon dioxide 
equivalent didn’t get into the atmosphere . . . For comparison, greenhouse 
gas emissions by all the countries totaled 46 billion tons in 2012 . . . 
Russia’s efforts have made it possible to delay global warming almost by a 
year.45 
Putin attributed much of these reductions in  GHGs emissions to Russia’s 
considerable modernization of its economy as well as to Russia’s implementation of new 
clean air and energy efficient technologies. Although Putin often in the past questioned 
the significance of mankind’s role in either causing or increasing climate change, Putin 
now seems to accept credit for Russia’s apparent success, whether it’s actually warranted 
or not. Savoring Russia’s somewhat skewed climate change success, Putin added, “We 
have simultaneously managed to actually double GDP over the same period. I want to say 
by this that it is quite possible to pay necessary attention to development and ensure 
development and care about nature.”46 
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Putin’s comments crediting Russia with delaying global warming for a year 
served as an interesting backdrop heading into the December 2015 UN Climate 
Conference in Paris. Many have called the conference an overall success since there were 
numerous moments during the negotiations when it seemed unlikely that any sort of 
written agreement would be achieved. Additionally, those that claim success also point to 
the immense complexity of persuading 195 countries to reach a complete accord on 
anything, much less to actually come to a unanimous agreement on something as 
extremely complicated as climate change.47 
However, most of the commentators who have called the UN Paris Climate 
Conference an overall success still tend to point to Russia’s contribution as lacking any 
real substance. As Brian Palmer puts it, 
While most of the developed world has agreed to draw down its 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2025 or 2030, Russia has promised only to 
limit growth to approximately 40 percent above current levels. The 
promise was almost universally regarded as unserious. (NRDC [National 
Resources Defense Council], which publishes onEarth, gave Russia an F 
for its carbon reduction commitment.)48 
While it still remains to be seen how long Russia will continue down this path of 
almost complete climate change non-partcipation, it is safe to say that, based on its latest 
contribution at the UN Paris Climate Conference in 2015, there do not appear to be any 
significant changes to Russia’s climate change policies and programs anywhere on the 
horizon. 
B. PRIMARY CAUSES FOR RUSSIA’S CURRENT POLICIES AND 
PROGRAMS 
Following the Kyoto Protocol’s first negotiations in 1997, Russia was in a prime 
position to potentially benefit from the future effects of the cap and trade system that 
numerous countries were expected to participate in. These potential benefits seemed to 
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induce Russia into participating in a number of multinational climate change projects. In 
other words, the dividends that these projects were expected to deliver attracted Russia. 
While the origins of the Kyoto Protocol appeared to offer signicant signs of promise that 
Russia might end up playing a pivotal—possibly even leading—global role  in combating 
climate change, Russia has not done so. 
C. THE UNITED STATES AND THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 
The 1997 Russian delegates in Kyoto could be hailed as some of the best 
negotiators in modern history. Conversely, some might wonder how the negotiatiors from 
the other attending countries could allow such a blatantly inaccurate baseline to be agreed 
upon. However, one chooses to look at the Kyoto Protocol’s initial negotiations, Russia, 
as a result of those negotiations, had every reason to fully participate in policies and 
programs designed to combat climate change. Ironically, it was the United States that 
would essentially deincentivize much of Russia’s future collective participation in 
reducing GHGs emissions, by choosing not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol in 2001. 
Whether the United States understood at the time the overall future effect its non-
ratification decision would have on Russia’s future climate change policies and programs 
is up for debate.   The decision, however, appeared to remove many of the economic 
climate change policy incentives that Russia had previously expected to benefit from, 
under the Kyoto’s carbon cap and trade system. 
Like a great many of the other Kyoto Protocol participants, Russia has become 
involved in numerous other multinational climate change negotiations. Unlike other 
participants, however, Russia has continued to insist on using the extremely beneficial 
1990 baseline GHGs emissions level established under the Kyoto Protocol’s original 
negotiations. By continually referencing this baseline level while other participants are 
establishing more accurate and up to date baseline levels, Russia is able to claim 
signficant reductions in its GHGs emissions, while taking virtually no steps to actually 
reduce its overall carbon footprint. 
 23 
D. PUTIN’S LONG-TERM AUTHORITARIAN CONTROL 
Other factors appear to have contributed to Russia’s overall climate change 
inaction. One of these factors is the duration of the Russian presidential term. Russia’s 
current constitution was instituted in 1993, two years after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. The current constitution has been instrumental in allowing Vladimir Putin to 
retain Russian presidential authority for a grand total of three terms, so far. Article 81 of 
Russia’s Constitution states, “The President of the Russian Federation shall be elected for 
a term of four years,” and that “No one person shall hold the office of President of the 
Russian Federation for more than two terms in succession.”49  After Putin succeeded 
President Boris Yeltsin in 2000, he was president for a total of eight years, from 2000 to 
2008. Following Putin’s first two presidential terms, Dmitry Medvedev, who had 
previously served as Prime Minister under Putin, became Russia’s next president (2008-
2012). Many experts hold that Putin hand-selected Medvedev for the specific purpose of 
Putin being able to one day reassume the position as Russia’s president. 
In the meantine, Putin served as Medvedev’s Prime Minister in 2008–2012. 
Medvedev’s numerous struggles in his presidential role opened the door for Putin’s 
controversial election as Russia’s president once again in 2012. Only this second time 
around, Putin’s presidential term would be six years versus the previous four. Medvedev 
signed the constitutional amendment in 2008 that extended the duration of the term.50 
Putin was also President Yeltsin’s Prime Minister from August to December 
1999. This means that Putin has served as Russia’s President or Prime Minister since 
1999. Putin still has two years remaining in his current term (2012-2018) and also still 
has the opportunity to seek the nomination for a second successive six-year term. This 
means that Putin could serve an astonishing twenty four years in a row—in one office or 
another—as one of the most powerful men in Russia. 
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Putin’s long-term position of authority has been extremely detrimental to the 
overall direction of Russia’s climate change policies and programs. One of the reasons 
for this, as noted earlier, is that until 2009, Russian leaders refused to even acknowledge 
mankind’s likely contribution to climate change. Another reason why it could be argued 
that Putin has probably been Russia’s biggest overall climate change detractor is his 
tireless pursuit of unrelenting control over nearly all aspects of Russia’s entire media 
system. 
E. PUTIN’S MEDIA CONTROL 
Russia’s tight media control dates back to the days of the Soviet Union (1917-
1991) and the tsars before 1917. Jill Dougherty points out, “You can, of course, take a 
gang of men, give them some guns, and send them off to seize a broadcasting center. 
That’s what happened in October 1993 when Russian lawmakers revolted against Putin’s 
predecessor, Boris Yeltsin. They failed, but 69 people died in the attack on the 
government’s Ostankino Television Center.”51 Taking into consideration his 
predecessor’s lack of ability to control the media, Putin set out to reestablish the media 
control previously enforced under Soviet power. According to Timothy Heritage, “One of 
Putin’s initial acts after rising to power in 2000 was to restore Kremlin control over the 
media, which was much more outspoken under President Boris Yeltsin in the free-
wheeling decade after the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991. Most Russian media are now 
owned by the state or by private individuals or companies loyal to Putin.”52 
Putin’s press secretary, Dmitry Peskov, describes him as a news junkie: “As a 
former KGB officer and head of the KGB’s successor agency, the FSB, Putin knows the 
value of information . . . Whoever owns the news media systems control what they say. 
It’s not like President Putin has ever shied away from this idea, or even given a hint that 
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he is worried that the public is aware of how he feels.”53  Putin told reporters at a 2013 
news conference, “There should be patriotically minded people at the head of state 
information resources, people who uphold the interests of the Russian Federation. These 
are state resources. That is the way it is going to be.”54  Putin has implemented a strategy 
for controlling television and newspapers, and he has even expanded this control to the 
Internet. 
In 2014, President Putin signed a law aimed at minimizing foreign ownership of 
Russian media outlets. The law established a 20% limit of foreign ownership of these 
outlets. The overall goal of the law was to expand Putin’s control over Russian 
independent news media outlets. The author of the bill, Vadim Dengin, stated, “We 
understand very well that those who own information own the world. When foreigners 
come here to make money and then actively influence the media market and use it for 
their own benefit, at this moment, I want to say that I am ready to close down Russia and 
ensure its security.”55 
One would think that the Russian public would be up in arms regarding Putin’s 
media tactics, but this does not seem to be the case at all. Elizaveta Osentinskaya, a 
former editor for Forbes Russia, suggests, “Right now society doesn’t think it needs free 
media.”56  Russian society is instead left with a state-run television system that it seems 
perfectly content with. The vast majority of the Russian public receives its information 
from television on a daily basis. 
When it comes to climate change and global warming, the national media frame 
the issue in very different contexts. As Xiaoquan Zhao of George Mason University puts 
it, “Unlike many other social issues with which the public may have first-hand 
experience, global warming is an issue that many come to learn about through the media. 
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The primary source of mediated information about global warming is the news.”57  Most 
Russians receive information regarding climate change from Russia’s mainly state-run 
media conglomerates, and, as Marlene Laruelle points out, “It is unlikely that Russian 
‘civil society’ will be able to pressure public opinion and the government into becoming 
more engaged in its understanding of climate change.”58 
Putin’s intention is to minimize the independent media outlet voice in order to 
maximize the effectiveness of his state-run media outlets. One of the main climate change 
messages put out by these state-run media outlets is that Russia’s Arctic is currently 
projected to be its greatest future economic hope. Luke Coffey of Al-Jazeera writes, 
“Russia certainly has important interests in the Arctic region and even higher ambitions, 
but its Arctic agenda has little to do with climate change. Instead, it can be best described 
in the old-fashioned and often quite unhelpful terms of geopolitics.”59 
Russia has long had its sights set on its Arctic North where it has by far the 
longest Arctic bordering coastline. According to Coffey, “Russia is investing greatly in 
the region. Around $3.3bn will be invested in the Arctic on oil and gas and major 
infrastructure projects over the next five years.”60   Putin is using the Arctic’s potential 
benefits overall to promote Russian nationalism.  Coffey continues, “For Putin, the Arctic 
is an area that allows Russia to flex its muscles without incurring any significant 
geopolitical risk. Because nationalism is on the rise in Russia, Putin’s Arctic strategy is 
popular among the population.”61  In essence, Putin uses this renewed Russian 
nationalism regarding the Arctic to provide the Russian public with a glimmer of hope 
during its current economic hardship. As far as implementing any new Russian climate 
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change policies in the Arctic, however, there has been no indication that Putin has any 
inclination to do so. 
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IV. CHINA 
Some experts say that the Kyoto Protocol was flawed from the outset because it 
didn’t cover the three countries that currently produce the highest percentage of the 
world’s GHGs emissions: China, India, and the United States. China has the highest 
percentage of the world’s GHGs emissions at 23%. The United States is next at 15%, 
followed by India at 5%. The United States did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol because of 
concern that it might somehow harm its future strategic interests. As stated by President 
George W. Bush, 
Kyoto is, in many ways, unrealistic. Many countries cannot meet their 
Kyoto targets. The targets themselves were arbitrary and not based upon 
science. For America, complying with those mandates would have a 
negative economic impact, with layoffs of workers and price increases for 
consumers. And when you evaluate all these flaws, most reasonable 
people will understand that it’s not sound public policy. That’s why 95 
members of the United States Senate expressed a reluctance to endorse 
such an approach.62 
President Bush might have added that China and India have never had binding 
targets because they have always been considered developing countries under the Kyoto 
Protocol. Critics argue that it is hard to take the Protocol seriously when it does not 
involve the most substantial contributors to the problem.63 
Beyond the December 2012 Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, which 
established a second commitment period from 2013 to 2020,64 there were also 
negotiations in Lima in 2014 that attempted to establish a legal framework to enforce 
payment on countries with higher GHG emissions. A huge problem confronting the 
framework was that China, India, and the United States had all taken the same stance—
                                                 
62. President George W. Bush, “President Bush Discusses Global Climate Change,” The White House, June 11, 
2001, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010611-2.html. 
63. Steven Gelis, “Kyoto Protocol, 10 years later: Did deal to combat greenhouse emissions work and what of its 
future?,” National Post, February 14, 2015, http://news.nationalpost.com/news/world/kyoto-protocol-10-years-later-
was-the-deal-to-combat-greenhouse-emissions-successful-and-what-of-its-future. 
64. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, “Kyoto Protocol,” April 21, 2016, 
https://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php. 
 30 
that is, they would not commit to a treaty that would impose any legal obligation 
requiring them to reduce emissions. As Corina Haita of the International Center for 
Climate Governance noted, “It’s interesting to note the evolution of China, whose CO2 
emissions level was half that of the USA in 1990 . . . China overtook the USA in 2005, 
becoming the largest emitter of GHGs emissions. Therefore, China is becoming a crucial 
player in the international climate change agreements and the continuation of the Kyoto 
Protocol.”65  While estimates differ regarding China’s predicted national emissions peak, 
there are some signs that appear to indicate a decrease in China’s overall emissions 
output. According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, “After rising 6.7% per 
year for the previous decade, China’s emissions growth slowed to 1.2% in 2014. The 
lower growth in China’s emissions compared with the previous year was driven primarily 
by relatively stable coal use (measured in energy terms).”66 
China and the United States ca not seem to agree on each other’s responsibilities 
regarding emissions. For instance, the two countries are far apart when it comes to the 
spectrum of responsibilities concerning the Kyoto Protocol. Even though the United 
States was one of the original signatory participants of the Protocol, it never actually 
ratified it. As Shannon Tiezzi points out, 
The United States has always been reluctant to accept drastic emissions 
cuts. Recently, this foot-dragging has been more and more tied to the 
United States’ economic rivalry with China—U.S. politicians are 
unwilling to commit to emissions cuts that would not apply equally to 
China, fearing that it would put the United States at a disadvantage 
economically.67 
China, on the other hand, obviously looks at this question in a much different 
light. This was evident in 2013, when China walked out on negotiations in Warsaw, 
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Poland, concerning the Green Climate Fund. China, along with a group of other 
developing countries, wanted to require developed countries to pay $100 billion dollars a 
year to developing countries in order to help them adapt to climate change. China 
asserted that it still considered itself a developing nation, citing a low per capita GDP and 
high poverty rate.68 
A. CHINA BEYOND KYOTO 
Unlike Russia, China has visibly experienced the effects caused by its GHGs 
emissions and has begun to come to grips with the consequences of inaction. According 
to the World Health Organization, in China “the number of cancer patients and deaths 
because of lung, stomach, liver and esophagus diseases accounted for 30 percent, 40 
percent, 50 percent and 50 percent of the global total, respectively.”  Though these high 
percentages can only be regarded as partially attributable to China’s worsening air and 
water pollution, the effects on public health and public  opinion in China are still 
substantial.69 
Since China has always been considered a developing country under the Kyoto 
Protocol, it has not been required to lower its GHGs emissions. However, this has not 
stopped China from taking steps to curb its emissions and lessen its carbon footprint. 
China is the world’s biggest producer and consumer of coal, but it also understands that 
its coal resources are not infinite.   Chinese leaders have set the goal of deriving 15% of 
their country’s energy supplies from sources other than fossil fuels by 2020. Significant 
subsidies are provided to China’s clean energy sector, in the hope of helping to achieve 
this goal.70  Moreover, China has designated a sizeable portion of its national territory as 
ecological zones. These “red zones for ecological protections” make up about 20% of its 
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territory. Additionally, the Chinese have recently increased their nuclear power output 
with 15 reactors currently in use and 26 more reactors in the process of being built.71 
To be sure, some of China’s declarations regarding climate change have been less 
than fully convincing. For example, the bilateral climate change agreement reached with 
the United States in 2014. According to President Barrack Obama, 
The United States intends to achieve an economy-wide target of reducing 
its emissions by 26%-28% below its 2005 level in 2025 and to make best 
efforts to reduce its emissions by 28%. China intends to achieve the 
peaking of CO2 emissions around 2030 and to make best efforts to peak 
early and intends to increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary 
energy consumption to around 20% by 2030.72 
The point is not that all of China’s policies are stellar, but rather that, unlike 
Russia, China is actually implementing policies that acknowledge and—at least 
somewhat—attempt to curb its emissions. For instance, in 2014, China also pledged to 
obtain one-fifth of its electrical power from renewable sources by the year 2030.73 
China is additionally taking immediate steps to reduce its current carbon footprint 
by shutting down coal plants. The city of Beijing plans to shut down its four major coal-
fired power plants by the end of 2016, with the plan to replace them with gas-fired plants 
that can reportedly produce over two and a half times more electricity. The city of Beijing 
has also set its own goals beyond Chinese national goals, including cutting its annual coal 
consumption by 13 million tons before 2017.74 
Beijing has also imposed vehicle bans during times of especially bad pollution, 
such as during the 2008 Olympics, limiting driving to every other day when the city 
expects heavy pollution to persist for at least three days. According to Reuters, “the city’s 
environmental protection agency admits that telling residents they can only drive on 
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alternating days is not a viable long-term solution to Beijing’s pollution problem.”75  The 
point, however, is that at least current policy is being implemented. Another example is 
the 1978 initiation of the Three North Shelterbelt Project. The project has resulted in the 
planting of over 66 billion trees in China thus far. This is considered to be the largest tree 
planting project ever undertaken. The project is slated to end in 2050, and its overall goal 
is to increase the size of the world’s forests by ten percent.76 
B. SINGLE PARTY GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM 
China, like Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam, and a number of other countries, has a 
single party governmental system. Cheng Li writes, “There is no sign of a multiparty 
system emerging in the near future. The Chinese Communist Party will continue to have 
strict control over the army, media, legal and judicial system.”77  This for all intents and 
purposes allows the Chinese Communist Party to implement projects, as well as policies, 
without having to take into consideration the possibility of an oppositional public 
viewpoint. 
One of the major problems with a single party system is that the lack of 
oppositional viewpoints can lead to narrow-minded decisions that do not factor in the 
possible risks associated with them. One of the best examples of this is the Chinese 
Communist Party’s decision to build the Three Gorges Dam along the Yangzi River. The 
Three Gorges Dam project required relocating well over a million people, and even 
though the project seems to have provided an example of China’s conscientious effort to 
produce cleaner energy, it has also showed the Chinese government’s failure to take into 
account many of the substantial risks posed in the creation of such a monumental dam. 
International opinion regarding the project warned of many of these possible 
consequences, but these warnings appeared to fall on deaf ears. The Three Gorges Dam 
Project was approved by Chinese leaders in 1992. The project began construction in 1994 
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and was eventually completed in 2006. The Three Gorges Dam—to this day—remains 
the largest dam ever built in the world, at just over five times larger than the Hoover 
Dam.78  By all accounts, the Three Gorges Dam is truly an engineering marvel. The 
growing concerns over the risks posed by the dam, however, may prove to be as immense 
as the dam itself. For example, some have argued that the body of water created by the 
dam has led to an increase in seismic activity within the region. According to Blake 
Campbell-Hyde, “Frighteningly, the dam may have been tied to major earthquakes—
including the one in May of 2008 which killed 87,000 people—by placing tremendous 
pressure and fluctuation (by rapidly raising and dropping water volume) on the 
underlying geological plates.”79 
Many experts have also warned that the reservoir’s water could eventually 
become too polluted over time to provide adequate drinking water for future generations. 
Beyond water quality, there were numerous other environmental concerns associated 
with the construction of the dam.   According to Conrad Schirokauer and Donald N. 
Clark, “The government discounted warnings about the potential disaster posed by the 
buildup of silt behind the dam, unpredictable geologic effects, the dangers of forming a 
lake even more polluted than the present river, and possible adverse effects 
downstream.”80 
Additionally, the human rights violations resulting from the forced relocation of 
such an immense number of citizens almost assuredly would have never allowed for the 
project to have even broken ground in most traditional democratic nations. It has also 
been argued that the project would have actually been much less expensive and more 
favorable to the protection of the environment if a series of smaller dams had instead 
been built. By building the Three Gorges Dam, though, China was able to buttress the 
growth potential of Chongqing in Sichuan, which (some observers argue) could not have 
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been accomplished through the building of a series of smaller dams. Chinese leaders 
apparently believed that the chosen “megadam” approach was the only way in which to 
provide Sichuan with the maritime accessibility required to unleash Chongqing’s 
metropolis potential.81 
The Three Gorges Dam project not only helps to show that China’s single party 
government system is indeed taking action to implement programs and projects aimed at 
producing cleaner energy for the future, but it also appears to show that the Chinese 
Communist Party is seemingly more concerned with future economic growth than it is 
with future environmental protections. 
C. CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES 
While individual projects may, at a minimum, show signs of climate change 
progress, it is actual policy implementation that is likely to be more accurate in gauging 
China’s overall national progress in combatting climate change. An example that helps to 
illustrate this point is that, even though China’s first institutionalized agency for 
countering climate change originated in 1987, when China’s State Science and 
Technology Commission (SSTC) first established the Chinese National Climate 
Committee (CNCC)—it would still take about another twenty years for any documented 
attempt at climate change policy implementation.82 
The tenth Five Year Plan, which covered the period 2001–2005, was the first to 
mention climate change. Even though an actual reference to climate change only 
occurred once in the plan, its mere initial mention set the stage for China’s eleventh Five 
Year Plan, which covered the period 2006–2010, when actual Chinese domestic climate 
change policy targets began to take shape. The most significant of the targets within the 
eleventh Five Year Plan were:  to reduce water consumption per unit of GDP by 20%, to 
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reduce major pollutant emissions by 10%, and to increase forest coverage by 18.2 to 
20.0%.83 
In 2007—during the early period of the eleventh Five Year Plan—China 
established the National Climate Change Program. Near the end of the eleventh Five 
Year Plan China took the seemingly unprecedented step—possibly altering the future 
global landscape of combatting climate change—of pledging to reduce its overall carbon 
intensity by 40–45%  per unit of GDP by 2020. The U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) defines carbon intensity as “the amount of carbon by weight 
emitted per unit of energy consumed.”84  The significance of this target was that it did not 
occur solely in a domestic policy setting. Instead, China made this pledge on the 
international level, at the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference in December 2009. 
An additional point of significance of China’s Copenhagen pledge was that its 
commitments regarding emissions reductions were based on 2005 levels, unlike Russia’s 
continued insistence on using 1990 Kyoto Protocol GHGs baseline levels. 
Many critics have pointed out that China’s pledge at Copenhagen (under the 
auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC]) 
was not in any way legally binding. While this is correct, the real significance of the 
pledge resides in China’s overall shift in mindset. Since the first negotiation of the Kyoto 
Protocol back in 1997, China had always insisted that developing countries should not be 
obligated to achieve any emission reductions, until developed countries had first met their 
emission reduction goals. This may seem like an illogical argument to many, but the 
reality is that in 2013 developed countries were responsible on average for 6 times more 
GHGs emissions per capita than were developing nations. Additionally, while projections 
of GHGs emissions per capita anticipated that those of developing nations would grow at 
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a higher rate than those of developed countries, these same projections also forecast a 
much higher GHGs emission rate per capita in developed countries well beyond 2035.85 
What really matters in this particular instance is the fact that China went against 
its previous narrative. Even though China’s emissions reduction pledge at Copenhagen 
was not legally binding, the ground-breaking aspect was that it was not contingent on the 
developed countries first reducing their emissions.86 
China’s climate change policies and initiatives continued to expand in the 12th 
Five Year Plan period (2011–2015). It was during this period that the first domestic 
carbon-specific target was announced. Another positive aspect of the 12th Five Year Plan 
was that the relative target reduction date was revised to 2010 to more accurately reflect 
China’s GHGs emission levels at the time. Overall, this meant that China was attempting 
to reduce its carbon intensity by 17 percent by the end of the 12th Five Year Plan period, 
as compared to 2010 emission levels.87 
China, on its own, has even gone as far as to implement a trial cap-and-trade 
system that was initially implemented in five cities and two towns. The overall idea was 
that when a Chinese business exceeded its GHGs emissions limit it could then purchase 
emissions credits from another Chinese business. While the system has not appeared to 
progress much since its original inception back in 2008, its attempted implementation 
could still be considered a positive sign—an expression of constructive intentions.88 
Perhaps the most significant development was China’s willingness in 2014 to 
enter into a bilateral climate change agreement with the United States. One of the major 
U.S. critiques of the Kyoto Protocol was that it did not set emissions targets for two of 
the world’s three largest GHGs emitters: China and India. In this context, a climate 
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change agreement between the world’s two largest GHGs emitters (China and the United 
States) can be regarded as of monumental significance. In this agreement, China 
committed (a) to reversing its increasing GHGs emissions by 2030 and (b) to increasing 
its non-fossil fuel energy share by 20% during the same period, while the United States 
agreed to a 26%–28% GHGs emission reduction from its 2005 levels by 2025.89   
Additionally, Valerie Karplus of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology writes, 
The deal also includes a renewed commitment to engage in joint research 
and development on building energy efficiency, alternative fuel vehicles, 
clean coal, and a newly added focus on the energy-water nexus. This deal 
also breaks the cycle of each nation waiting for the other to act first, and it 
invites other nations—especially developing nations that previously 
viewed commitments as premature or unfair—to declare contributions to 
the global effort.90 
In 2015, at the Conference of the Parties (CoP) to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Paris, China reaffirmed the goals 
previously established in its 2014 bilateral agreement with the United States. China also 
agreed to take on two additional goals in its intended nationally-determined contribution 
(INDC) to the Paris accord. The first was to decrease GHGs emissions per unit of GDP 
by 60 to 65 percent. China’s second additional goal was to increase forest carbon stock 
by 4.5 billion cubic meters, with both of these goals being relative to China’s overall 
2005 levels of each.91 
As previously noted, the obvious problem with the UNFCCC is that none of the 
agreements reached is in any way legally binding. This means that 195 countries—on the 
surface—appear to have pledged to hit GHGs emissions reductions targets, but the reality 
is that there are absolutely no punitive measures in place if a country does not achieve its 
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reduction goals. In other words, each country is merely being held accountable in the 
court of global public opinion.92 
Many have argued that China is unlikely to ever agree to a legally binding accord 
on climate change because it is not in its economic interest to do so. In other words, if 
there’s a choice to be made between potential economic growth or potential GHGs 
emission reductions, China is likely to always choose economic growth. While this 
indeed may still prove true, accountability obligations and the resulting lack of trust in 
the court of public opinion (domestic and international) could end up proving more 
punitive than any legally binding agreement might have been. The reality is that only 
time will ultimately reveal the seriousness of each country’s pledges.93 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The case studies involving China and Russia illustrate that there are numerous 
reasons for the diverging climate change approaches that China and Russia have chosen 
to take over the last few decades. These case studies highlight three factors in particular 
that probably played the most significant roles in their diverging climate change policies 
and programs. 
The first of these factors was the Kyoto Protocol, which set the initial 
foundation—or baseline—for China’s and Russia’s climate change policies. In China’s 
case, the Kyoto Protocol seemed to completely excuse developing countries from almost 
any participation in attempts to reduce GHGs emissions until developed countries had 
accomplished substantial emissions reductions first. By doing so, the Kyoto Protocol 
practically endorsed climate change inaction prior to Chinese diplomats having to even 
sit down at the negotiating table. 
In Russia’s case, the initial 1997 Kyoto Protocol baseline negotiations were so 
favorable that they incentivized Russia to continue to participate in climate change 
negotiations on the international stage.   It is difficult to determine whether Russia would 
have chosen to continue to participate within the framework of the Kyoto Protocol if 
Russia’s GHGs emissions baseline had been updated beyond its 1990 level. It is certain, 
however, that Russia’s climate change incentives quickly evaporated when the United 
States chose not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol in 2002. 
The second significant factor is the combination of geography and demography. 
Simply put, China is much smaller than Russia, but it has many more people. Even 
though China has been under virtually no international obligations to reduce its GHGs 
emissions, Chinese leaders have opted to take action because of the visible physical 
effects China has already begun to experience from climate change. In contrast, Russia’s 
sparsely populated and vastly more extensive countryside has not experienced similar 
visible physical effects. Therefore, Russian leaders have not had to take the same climate 
change steps that Chinese leaders were forced to take. 
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Finally, the third significant factor has been the lengthy and continuous leadership 
of Russia’s current president, Vladimir Putin. It is remarkable that Putin has held a 
substantial position of authority in Russia since August 16, 1999, when he initially served 
as President Boris Yeltsin’s Prime Minister. An argument can be made that for Russia the 
most critical constant variable since the Kyoto Protocol’s original negotiations in 1997 
has been Putin’s leadership role. Not only has his leadership role been constant, but his 
climate change policies seem to have been equally consistent as well. In other words, 
Putin has been unwavering in his continued insistence that Russia take absolutely no 
action in combatting climate change. 
It is important to note that Putin’s climate change consistency lies in his actions, 
rather than his rhetoric, as he recently stated, “The quality of life of all people on this 
planet depends on . . . our ability to resolve the problem of climate change.”94  Putin’s 
actions, however, continue to indicate the same non-participant climate change policies 
of Russia’s recent history. Quentin Buckholz describes Putin’s public rhetoric as 
purposely masking “the reality that there has been no substantive change in Russia’s 
attitude toward climate change or willingness to act decisively to address the issue.”95 
A. NATURAL SELECTION VERSUS MUTUAL AID 
There seems to be a natural tendency to think of the Communist origins of China 
and Russia as one and the same. The truth is, however, that their communist roots are 
distinct in important ways. The Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin believed itself to be the 
supreme nation that was eventually meant to rule the communist world, when the 
communist dream was finally realized.96  China looked to the Soviet Union for 
acceptance into the communist order during its infant stages of communism. 
Even though China looked to Stalin’s Soviet Union for guidance, China 
eventually chose its own distinct path to communism. While the Chinese Communist 
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Party (CCP) completed its conquest of the mainland in 1949, most countries for several 
years endorsed Chiang Kai-shek and the nationalist Guomindang (GMD) as the ruling 
government in China. Mao and the CCP established the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) on October 1, 1949, and the GMD was forced out of continental China and 
obliged to flee to Taiwan. Stalin died in 1953. Meanwhile, Mao had assumed that the 
leadership role for the communist world would naturally be passed along from Stalin to 
him. Instead, Nikita Khrushchev denounced Stalinism in 1956, thereby creating an even 
greater political rift between the Chinese and Soviet Communist parties.97  Unresolved 
border disputes over territories dating back to the nineteenth century and earlier have 
only served to further fuel the bitterness between the two countries. 
On top of long-standing disputes over territory, the disparity in available natural 
resources between China and Russia is also becoming increasingly apparent. As China’s 
scarcity of natural resources continues to become more pressing—further enhanced by 
the effects of climate change—Chinese leaders will have to deal with this mounting 
problem. Russian leaders will in turn have to react to these future Chinese policies 
because of the impact that they are likely to have on Russia. 
Chinese leaders are likely to continue on their current path of climate change 
policy implementation and to further China’s cooperation with Russia regarding the 
increasing flow of Chinese immigrants from northern China into southern Russia. 
According to a 2008 climate change report by the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief 
Great Britain (OXFAM-GB) and the Word Wildlife Fund (WWF)-Russia, 
All over Central Asia, China and, possibly, in Mongolia there will be 
increasing demand for water for irrigation purposes, human use and 
hydropower stations. Climate change consequences don’t happen on their 
own but rather exacerbate the already existing serious stresses upon the 
environment. Assessment of social losses is a challenging task. There is no 
complete information on social losses yet; however, it is already clear that 
the losses will be huge and millions of people will be forced to migrate.98 
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While there have been numerous joint immigration ventures between China and 
Russia in the past, there are signs that Russia’s population is becoming more and more 
concerned with the increased flow of Chinese immigrants into Russia’s less populated 
southeastern territories. Russia enforced a much stricter Chinese immigrant deportation 
policy in the recent past. According to Jeanne Wilson’s account regarding Russian action 
on Chinese immigration in 1994, “Border controls regulating the presence of Chinese in 
the area were also stepped up. Over the years, the Russian Border Guards, the Interior 
Ministry, and the Federal Counterintelligence Service carried out a series of 
movements—codenamed ‘Operation Foreigner’—to identify and deport Chinese illegal 
aliens.”99 
At present the overall relations between China and Russia could be characterized 
as cooperative. However, it’s not that difficult to imagine those relations quickly turning 
hostile due to the disparity in natural resources and the prospect of sharper immigration 
disputes. Additionally, China and Russia have had territorial disputes in the past, and as a 
result, Russia is currently in possession of territory once owned by China that many 
Chinese still believe rightly belongs to China. As Mao Zedong described it to a visiting 
Japanese delegation in 1964, “About a hundred years ago the area east of Baikal became 
Russian and since then Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Kamchatka and other points have 
become territories of the Soviet Union. We have not yet presented the bill for this list.”100 
China and Russia have both made recent attempts to expand their territorial 
claims. China has done so with its recent territorial claims of islands that Beijing has 
newly constructed in the South China Sea, and Russia has done so with its recent 
expansive territorial claims in the Arctic—to say nothing of its annexation of Crimea in 
March 2014. China may eventually attempt to alleviate the disparity of land, natural 
resources, and population density between China and Russia by seizing Russian territory 
previously belonging to China. Doing so would hypothetically provide China with the 
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land necessary to solve its current population density problem, while also providing an 
abundance of additional natural resources that China may regard as necessary in the 
future. 
While some may consider the idea of China engaging Russia in a conflict over 
something as basic as natural resources far-fetched, numerous renowned theorists have 
proposed that a scarcity of resources will inevitably lead to catastrophic future crises. The 
most prominent of these theorists is Robert Malthus, the author of the Malthusian crisis 
prediction. Malthus famously predicted that an inevitable crisis will grip the earth when 
population growth surpasses the earth’s food production capability.   According to 
Malthus, “There is a principle in human society, by which population is perpetually kept 
down to the level of the means of subsistence.”101  In his crisis prediction’s purest form, 
the crisis will occur simply due to the basic relationship of supply and demand:  not 
enough food to supply the demand of the earth’s population. 
Critics have argued that the industrial revolution proved the Malthusian crisis 
prediction invalid, yet when applied on a national or regional level, versus a global level, 
the prediction’s accuracy is almost undeniable because of the recurrence of famines 
throughout world history. While these famines have not occurred—at least to this point—
at the global level, they have certainly struck at the national and regional level, some 
owing to natural causes and some owing to human actions. For Malthus, famine was for 
all intents and purposes, the world’s last impenetrable natural barrier to keep the global 
population under control. As Malthus described it, 
Famine seems to be the last, the most dreadful resource of nature. The 
power of population is so superior to the power of the earth to produce 
subsistence for man that premature death must in some shape or other visit 
the human race. The vices of mankind are active and able ministers of 
depopulation. They are the precursors in the great army of destruction, and 
often finish the dreadful work themselves. But should they fail in this war 
of extermination, sickly seasons, epidemics, pestilence, and plague 
advance in terrific array, and sweep off their thousands and tens of 
thousands. Should success be still incomplete, gigantic inevitable famine 
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stalks in the rear and with one mighty blow levels the population with the 
food of the world.102 
Another aspect of Malthus’ writings that correlates to Communist China was his 
suggestion of regulating child birth to reduce future food production demand. China 
implemented a single child policy in 1980 for this exact reason. While Malthus made this 
suggestion in specific reference to implementing this policy among England’s poor 
population at the time, China went even further and applied it to its entire population, 
though in 2015, China phased out its single child policy in favor of a two child policy.103 
In addition, yet another theory that seems to validate the likelihood of China and 
Russia sparring over future dwindling natural resources is Charles Darwin’s natural 
selection theory, which actually derived a key ingredient from Malthus’ On Population. 
This key ingredient was Malthus’ observation that human populations tend to double on 
average every 25 years. Darwin applied this same propensity for population growth to 
plant and animal populations. Only Darwin proposed that when faced with dwindling 
natural resources (including food supply) the plants and animals that were the most 
physically fit would be most likely to survive and thus pass their genes on to the next 
generation. This is why many have commonly referred to Darwin’s natural selection 
theory as the survival of the fittest.104 
When formulating his natural selection theory, Darwin observed plants and 
animals in the tropical environment of the Galápagos Islands. The question in this 
particular case though, is what would happen to Darwin’s natural selection theory if it 
was faced with the nearly constant freezing conditions of Russia’s Siberia?  Ironically, it 
would be under these specific conditions that one of the strongest natural selection theory 
counterarguments would emerge, Peter Kropotkin’s mutual aid theory. Kropotkin was a 
Russian evolutionary theorist who observed organisms working together against the harsh 
freezing environmental conditions of Siberia. Kropotkin’s mutual aid theory was that 
nature’s true form of competition was “a second form of struggle—the style that Darwin 
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called metaphorical—[that] pits [an] organism against the harshness of surrounding 
physical environments, not against other members of the same species.”105  Up until now, 
Kropotkin’s mutual aid theory has been surprisingly accurate regarding the behavior of 
organisms in the harsh freezing conditions of Russia’s Siberia. Just as Kropotkin 
personally witnessed among the organisms in Siberia, man’s true form of struggle has 
been—for the most part—against the harshness of the surrounding physical environment 
in Siberia, rather than against that of other men. 
If Kropotkin’s mutual aid theory is correct, it would seem logical that Darwin’s 
natural selection theory does not hold up under the historically harsh environmental 
conditions in Siberia. However, as one examines the expected future physical 
environmental conditions of Siberia, it seems that Kropotkin might, in the end, actually 
agree with Darwin. Today’s generally accepted global consensus is that Russia’s frozen 
Siberia is not only beginning to experience a thawing, but that this thawing is just the 
beginning of an eventual overall evolution toward an ecosystem that resembles a tropical 
environment, or what Darwin’s natural selection theory described as the conditions 
required for “the form of struggle that pits organism against organism.”106  Simply put, 
climate change—in all likelihood—appears to be transforming the environmental 
conditions in Siberia from those of mutual aid to those of the survival of the fittest. 
B. FINAL REFLECTIONS 
As suggested in the introduction, this comparison of China’s and Russia’s climate 
change policies and programs could prove useful for U.S. national security policy 
because of the inherent importance of climate change for the United States and its allies.   
The comparison could not only help to identify gaps in current U.S. policy but also assist 
with suggestions for future U.S. policy prescriptions. 
Since China and Russia are among the most influential states in determining the 
future of coordinated international responses to climate change, it is imperative for the 
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United States to better understand the determinants of their policies in this domain. 
Moreover, China and Russia arguably pose the two greatest current state threats to U.S 
national security. Understanding their past and present actions to combat climate change 
might help to better forecast their policy prescriptions in the future. 
Lastly, the divergence of climate change policies in China and Russia may pose 
significant regionally specific national security concerns in relations between the two 
countries. As China undertakes further measures to deal with climate change, a serious 
risk of an increased volatility within the region could arise. The disparities in natural 
resources, geography, and demography between China and Russia are becoming more 
and more evident. These disparities are likely to be exacerbated  as China continues to 
observe its Russian neighbor taking little to no action to curb its GHGs emissions. 
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